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Abstract 
The distinction between the abstract and the concrete is useful in understanding the way in 
which theories relate to phenomenon, respectively, or vice versa.  The connection between 
theory and the actual workings of scientific experiments can further be situated within 
scientific revolutions.  This distinction has been considered in light of revolutions by Thomas 
Kuhn and via the concept of model use in science by Nancy Cartwright.  Philosophers 
including Cartwright have argued that scientific models that focus on the phenomenon are 
important in scientific use.  This argument has faced criticisms that argue of the 
temporariness of these types of models.  Ultimately, in this thesis, I will show that the 
temporariness of concrete models is not a valid criticism due to the models’ role in problem 
solving in times of scientific revolution.  To do so, I will first present the abstract-concrete 
distinction given by Cartwright, and Kuhn,  I will then present a case study of the revolution 
in the development of models within superconductivity theory in order to trace the distinction 
between theories, the abstract level, and the phenomenon, the concrete level.  The London-
London model of superconductivity (a model created by Fritz and Heinz London to describe 
the expulsion of a magnetic field within a superconducting material) has previously been 
discussed in the abstract-concrete context by Cartwright, but BCS theory (named after the 
scientists who proposed it, John Bardeen, Leon Cooper, and John Robert Schrieffer to 
describe the low energy state of superconducting materials) has been largely absent in the 
same discussion context.  I will use both, the London-London model and BCS theory, to 
argue that during times of scientific revolution, focus that was initially placed on an abstract 
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level (theory) is moved to the concrete level (phenomenon) as a method of solving previously 
unsolvable problems.  In discussing the London-London model, I will present Cartwright, 
Towfic Shomar, and Mauricio Suarez’ arguments for the London-London model being a 
phenomenological model.  I will also present criticisms of this view with a particular focus 
on the notion that concretely developed models are temporary; I will argue that concrete 
models may be temporary, but they are necessary in resolving scientific crises.  In this 
manner, I am extending Cartwright et. al.’s argument for the usefulness of non-theory-driven 
model construction. Finally, I will show the parallels in development of BCS theory with the 
London-London model, and present the resolution of the revolution in superconductivity with 
the connection of the concretely developed model and the abstract, quantum theory via BCS 
theory’s discovery of Cooper pairs (electrons that pair up in low temperatures). 
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Chapter 1 
Abstract/Concrete Distinctions in the Philosophy of Science 
Literature 
1.1 Introduction 
Nancy Cartwright, along with Towfic Shomar and Mauricio Suarez, outlined an argument for 
the use of phenomenological modeling in describing phenomenon using the London-London 
model1.  They argued that in the development of the London-London model of 
superconductivity, the London brothers relied on their observations of the Meissner effect 
(see footnote 1) rather than the predictions of pre-existing theory.  Phenomenological models 
were developed to show the place of models as problem solving tools when theories cannot 
account for a certain phenomenon.   
A complaint, however, about phenomenological models is that they would only be 
temporarily useful.  These models would only see use when a pre-existing theory failed to 
account for a phenomenon, and would once again be discarded when a new theory can 
account for the previously unsolved phenomenon.  While a reliance on the phenomenological 
model may indeed be temporary, this is not necessarily a drawback.  In fact, problem solving 
via models that rely on the phenomenon can be helpful during times of scientific revolution.  
In this thesis, I will show that scientists have in fact relied on phenomena as the main method 
of problem solving throughout the history of superconductivity via the London-London 
                                                 
1 A model developed in 1935 to describe the observation of the expulsion of magnetic fields from within the 
superconducting material (the Meissner effect).  I will go into further detail regarding this model and the 
Meissner effect in chapter 2. 
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model and BCS theory.  This involves not only an extension on the application of Cartwright 
et al.’s argument to a case study not previously examined, but also a more comprehensive 
version of Cartwright et al.’s argument to include the scope of concrete models that are not 
necessarily phenomenological. 
First, I will discuss the stages of scientific revolutions as posited by Thomas Kuhn.  In 
order to describe a nuanced notion of the relation between theories and observations, I will 
adapt Cartwright’s argument about the concrete and abstract in model construction, where 
the concrete refers to the phenomenon and the abstract refers to a theory.  The usefulness of 
temporary models that rely on the concrete level is shown in their role in advancing science 
when theories cannot. 
In this chapter, I will outline the distinctions present in literature between the abstract and 
the concrete along with comparing and contrasting similarities and differences in their 
definitions.  I will focus on the distinctions presented by Thomas Kuhn and Nancy 
Cartwright.  I will show that as Cartwright herself argues, she tends to agree with Kuhn’s 
distinction but adds the distinction between models and theories to the original abstract- 
concrete discussion.  I will then ultimately argue that a combination of Cartwright’s and 
Kuhn’s distinctions best explains the methods in which the abstract or the concrete are relied 
upon during problem solving at times of scientific crises, along with providing supporting 
examples in following chapters. 
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1.2 Thomas Kuhn 
Thomas Kuhn’s distinctions between the abstract and the concrete are discussed with the 
terms of symbolic generalizations and manipulations.  Since the approaches to model 
construction depend on the stages of scientific revolutions, and since Kuhn discusses his 
distinctions within the framework of revolutions, let us first visit these stages. 
1.2.1 Stages of a Revolution 
Kuhn outlined the notion of scientific revolutions in relation to paradigms and paradigm 
shifts in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, where working scientific paradigms are 
“announced” together with their applications in real phenomenon (47).  Kuhn first discusses 
the notion of normal science, and moves on to how normal science may face a crisis that 
leads to a revolution.   
Normal science is the stage where a working paradigm has already been established with 
the acceptance of some fundamental theory being crucial.  The paradigm serves as a guide 
for scientists within the field to perform experiments and solve minor puzzles that arise.  An 
example of a paradigm is Newtonian physics including his theories of motion and optics 
(Kuhn 13).  Newton’s three laws of motion were accepted by the scientific community after 
due scrutiny, and following this acceptance, the laws were applied to a variety of cases such 
as calculations of work, or more specific cases of harmonic oscillators.  Working within this 
paradigm meant solving kinematic problems by using and building upon the ideas of 
Newton.   
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Kuhn argues, “To be accepted as a paradigm, a theory must seem better than its 
competitors, but it need not, and in fact never does, explain all the facts with which it can be 
confronted” (18).  The modern focus on quantum mechanics rather than Newtonian 
mechanics displays an area where quantum theories seem to explain more facts than the 
competing Newtonian theories.  This foundational change in the manner of explaining 
phenomenon and theory is a paradigm shift.  He also argues that these shifts are similar to 
gestalt shifts, where the world view of the scientists changes drastically.  In a sense, the 
scientists working with Newtonian motion in mind sees the world differently than one 
working with relativistic motion (Kuhn 121).  With the example of Newton’s theories serving 
as paradigms for kinematics and optics, we can see that paradigms are accepted conditions 
for working within a scientific field (Kuhn 23).  Furthermore, paradigms require articulation 
through experimentation so as to extend the facts that the paradigm displays as revealing 
(Kuhn 24).  Students learn the accepted methods and conditions of a paradigm through 
resolving canonical problems usually through textbooks published by scientists already 
subscribed to and working within the paradigm (Kuhn 20). 
A change in paradigms, a paradigm shift, occurs with the encounter of many anomalies 
that cannot be explained via the theories of the paradigm.  Accounting for anomalies requires 
the upheaval and ultimate rejection of the original paradigm.  These anomalies are the main 
problems that incite paradigm shifts since the new paradigm that accounts for anomalies 
must be different in a non-trivial manner from the old paradigm.  Regarding Newtonian 
optics, Kuhn argues that, “... the wave theory that replaced Newton’s [theory of light] was 
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announced in the midst of growing concern about anomalies in relation of diffraction and 
polarization effects to Newton’s theory.” (68) As such, we see an awareness of the anomalies 
surrounding Newtonian theories in certain fields of Newtonian optics.  These anomalies can 
be solved by observations over time and retooling the methods of the current paradigm. 
Since working within a paradigm also affects the way a scientist sees the world, in a 
paradigm change, previously anomalous problems may be seen as solved.  For instance, the 
difficulty in reconciling retrograde motion in a geocentric paradigm of astrophysics was no 
longer an issue in Copernican heliocentrism (Kuhn 93).  An anomaly in one paradigm need 
not be an anomaly in another paradigm, so different paradigms include different particular 
theories.   
Described above are the stages in which a scientific revolution occurs.  First, the working 
paradigm of normal science encounters one or more anomalies that it cannot solve.  When 
the anomalies become more than just another puzzle, they evoke a crisis (Kuhn 82).  This 
causes scientists to search for a new paradigm.  When anomalies are solved using methods 
outside of reliance on the defunct paradigm, a new paradigm may be proposed and adopted 
(Kuhn 85).  Regarding the details of normal science, Kuhn argues that it seldom aims to 
produce major conceptual or phenomenal novelties (35).  Furthermore, results of experiments 
that cannot be used to articulate the theory from which they were derived remain as mere 
facts, unrelated to the progress of that paradigmatic theory (Kuhn 35).  Rather, normal 
science aims to solve puzzles using the tools provided by the paradigmatic theory.  These 
puzzles are contrasted with anomalies that the paradigmatic theory is ultimately at odds with. 
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Now that we have discussed the stages of a scientific revolution, let us consider the 
distinction between the symbolic generalizations and manipulations as presented by Kuhn. 
1.2.2 Symbolic Generalizations and Manipulations 
Kuhn presents a distinction between symbolic generalizations and manipulations of symbolic 
generalizations in the puzzle solving activity of science.  Symbolic generalizations are 
aspects of a fundamental theory such as the law of motion, 𝐹 = 𝑚𝑎 (Kuhn 187).  These 
symbolic generalizations can be manipulated to suit and problem solve for specific 
conditions such as the motion of a pendulum or other simple harmonic oscillators (Kuhn 
188).  The manipulations, as Kuhn describes them, are more concrete than the symbolic 
generalization itself since they are used in specific situations such as those of pendulums or 
springs.  𝐹 = 𝑚𝑎, on the other hand, is part of the overarching theory through which 
formulae for pendulums or springs can be attained. 
The manipulations can be used in mundane situations such as students of science learning 
various formulas or learning to problem solve in class.  Learning some manipulations along 
with the generalization, Kuhn argues, allows the student to learn to design other appropriate 
manipulations that interrelate with the generalization (187-189).  The similarity relation 
gained through understanding the interrelation between a generalization and its 
manipulations is one way in which normal puzzle solving occurs.  Regarding solving 
problems in paradigms, Kuhn argues, “Scientists solve puzzles by modeling them on 
previous puzzle-solutions, often with only minimal recourse to symbolic generalizations” 
(189).  This puzzle solving is accomplished through considering previous, related concrete 
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puzzle solutions rather than continuously deferring to the symbolic generalizations of 
theories since the generalizations of normal science are already commonly accepted. 
This puzzle solving directly applies to normal science where scientists simply focus on 
articulating phenomenon that the theories already supply (Kuhn 24).  In this manner, there 
would be minimal need to rethink the symbolic generalizations since the puzzles that require 
solving all share the same theories within the paradigm. 
1.2.3 Generalizations, Manipulations, and Revolutions together 
As discussed, Kuhn argues that anomalies that drive paradigm shifts cannot be solved 
through the paradigmatic theory alone (65).  These anomalies must occur and be solved via 
tools that do not rely on the previous fundamental theory entirely.  By combining Kuhn’s 
comments on the use of symbolic generalizations and manipulations with his framework of 
paradigm shifts, we can begin to see an outline of times for reliance on both abstract 
symbolic generalizations and concrete manipulations. 
During a period of normal science, the symbolic generalizations form part of the 
framework theory for a paradigm.  The framework theory outlines the theoretical 
explanations and expectations of scientists using that theory to solve puzzles.  Furthermore, 
these generalizations underlie the worldview of the scientists working with them.  During a 
time of crisis, these generalizations, however, cannot create useful derivations to explain and 
solve the anomaly.  As such, specific manipulations for the anomaly are relied upon.  These 
manipulations may be gathered from experimental data on the occurrence of the anomaly.  
By this, I mean that during a time of crisis, since the general theory fails in explaining away 
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the anomaly, scientists must focus on the particular phenomenon of the anomaly itself.  This 
argument is adapted by Nancy Cartwright to be applied in model creation techniques. 
1.3 Nancy Cartwright 
The distinction between the abstract and the concrete has been developed more thoroughly in 
Cartwright’s works about models.  Cartwright stresses her interest in the way models 
function through her distinction between models and theories.  While she ultimately argues 
that she and Kuhn share many similarities in thinking about the relation between theory and 
observation, Cartwright more specifically argues that, “Models make the abstract concepts of 
physics more concrete.  They also help to connect theory with the real world” (“How we 
Relate Theory to Observation” 270).  Fundamental laws of physics involve abstract concepts.  
This is presented in “Fables and Models,” where she states that, “We tend to think of the 
concepts of physics, though theoretical, as very concrete, like is red; or is travelling at 
186000 miles per second.  But it is better to take them as abstract descriptions, like is a 
success, or is work.” (36)  The fundamental laws of physics, and arguably the laws of non-
physics sciences as well, ought to be considered as abstract. 
Similar to Kuhn’s argument about manipulations of symbolic generalizations as showing 
the relationship between concrete variations and the abstract fundamental law, Cartwright 
argues that abstract concepts need “fitting out” in more concrete ways.  For instance, in the 
abstract notion of “working” lies more concrete descriptions of work activities such as 
washing the dishes, writing grant proposals, preparing lunch (Cartwright, “Fables and 
Models” 40).  At first glance, it may seem as though concrete descriptions are subsets of the 
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abstract, and that the concrete cannot give you any more information than the abstract.  
However, as Cartwright argues, there may be information present in the abstract (e.g., 
theories) that is not in the concrete (e.g., models that describe phenomenon).  For instance, if 
we were to simply say that we were washing the dishes last night without any indication of 
our enjoyment level of that activity, it could not be known that we classify dish washing as 
“work” rather than “leisure”.  As such, for complete information, we can accompany the 
concrete description with the abstract and say that we were working by washing the dishes 
(Cartwright, “Fables and Models” 40) 
Cartwright further discusses this distinction with terminology of reliance on the abstract as 
a “theory-driven” approach, and reliance on the more concrete through the instrumental 
approach.  Of these instrumental approaches, the phenomenological approach is discussed in 
detail in “The Tool Box of Science.”  “Tool Box” also discusses the London-London model 
of superconductivity, so it is crucial that we analyze this first. 
1.3.1 The Tool Box Method and Problem Solving 
Since this thesis focuses on the abstract/concrete distinction as a method of problem solving, 
we must visit Cartwright, Towfic Shomar, and Mauricio Suarez’s notion of how 
phenomenological models along with theories are simply tools in the tool box available to 
scientists.  This differs from views that hold theories as necessary in the creation of models, 
e.g., the theory-driven view discussed below.  In this manner, the Tool Box method looks at 
the manner in which the various tools are organized, where phenomenological modeling 
places the reliance on phenomenon as key for model creation. 
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Specific to the London-London model of superconductivity2, further presented in chapter 
2, Cartwright et al. discuss the notion of abstract concepts requiring fitting out within “Tool 
Box” by arguing that the initial theory-driven approach could not account for the Meissner 
Effect3.  As such, the London-London model acted as the catalyst required to abandon the old 
fundamental theory for a new, more fitted out formulation.   
The theory-driven approach is the notion that models are merely useful approximations to 
theories4, and the heuristics of model building dictated by theory-testing (Cartwright et al., 
“Tool Box” 138).  Theory-driven approaches to model construction include the covering law 
account, where theories have a “belly-full” of already-formed models within them, and the 
semantic view, where theories are just collections of models (Cartwright et al., “Tool Box” 
139).  Under either of these formulations, a model is created directly from the theory.  This 
approach emphasizes the reliance on theory more than any other factor in the process of 
model creation. 
Cartwright et al. endorse the instrumentalist5 view, where abstract theories should be used 
simply as a tool similar to a worker’s tool.  Theories are but one tool in the scientific tool box 
in the same manner that a hammer is but one tool.  In “Tool Box”, the instrumentalist 
interpretation is focused on the manner in which physics aims to represent the world.  
                                                 
2 Superconductivity is the phenomenon where a super cooled material may exhibit zero resistance.  This only 
occurs in certain materials, and the materials must be cooled beyond a critical temperature.  
3 The Meissner effect is the expulsion of magnetic fields within a superconducting material once it reaches its 
superconductive state. 
4 It may be important to note that I have not explicitly discussed what theories are outside of their relation to 
models or observations as it is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
5 It must be noted that the word “instrumentalist” is used in a different sense here than what is normally found 
in Philosophy of Science literature regarding the realism/anti-realism debate.  Instrumentalist in this case is 
merely concerned with using whatever tool they may to solve scientific problems. 
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Without the theory-driven approach, physics aims to represent the world through models, 
which describe the concrete, rather than theories (Cartwright et al. 140).  Cartwright et al.’s 
motivations for the instrumentalist, and more specifically, the phenomenological, approach to 
model construction arises from the thought that theory-driven approaches do not properly 
account for the manner in which some models have been created.  This is supported by the 
case study of the London-London model of superconductivity. 
The theory-driven views are ultimately rejected due to the manner in which theories are 
underdetermined by any amount of data, so the heavy reliance on theory cannot be justified 
as the best representations of the world.  Under the theory-driven view, theories and 
auxiliaries imply the data procured from experiments since theories are most dominant.  
However, due to underdetermination, we cannot know which underlying set of theories or 
auxiliaries truly imply the data we observe. 
𝑇 + 𝐴 → 𝑑  (1) 
𝑇′ + 𝐴′ → 𝑑  (2) 
T represents theories, A are auxiliary assumptions, and d is the set of data.  Similarly, T’ 
represents a non-T theory, and A’ represents non-A auxiliary assumptions.  With only the set 
of data, d, we do not know whether 1 or 2 is the true set of theories and auxiliaries that imply 
d (Cartwright et al. “Tool Box” 139).  We can consider the theory-driven view as a 
hierarchical one, where models and data must be derived from the theory in some manner.  
Note that I use the term derive and imply here interchangeably since the ultimate ideal of the 
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theory-driven view is that theories are foundational to scientific representation and 
interpretation. 
We may expand upon the criticism that Cartwright et al. presented to show how models 
relate to underdetermination of theory.  The “formula” of underdetermination above may be 
augmented with restrictions as follows to include the relationship between models and 
theories: 
𝑇 + 𝐴 → 𝑑, where T is a set of models, M (Semantic View)  (3) 
𝑇 → 𝑀 + 𝐴 → 𝑑, where M is a set of models (Covering Law)  (4) 
Within the theory-driven views, model construction would occur as a result of the theory 
itself rather than any data implied.  This illustrates the issue of underdetermination in the 
theory-driven view since we would ultimately not know whether our models are part of the 
correct set that imply our data, d.  From the augmented equations, we can see the following 
for covering law accounts: 
𝑇 → 𝑀 + 𝐴 → 𝑑  (4.1) 
𝑇′ → 𝑀′ + 𝐴′ → 𝑑  (4.2) 
Representation of the world by either models or theories is highly dubious in a theory-
driven view since theories and auxiliaries already imply data.  We cannot be sure which set 
of theories and auxiliaries, 4.1 or 4.2, imply our data set given our observations of solely the 
data set.  This issue can be mitigated with the instrumentalist approach, where scientists can 
configure the tools they use in order to represent the world.  In this manner, rather than 
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theories and auxiliaries both implying and representing data, models can represent data 
without the implication.  As such, there is a different relationship between models, theories, 
and everything else in the instrumentalist approach. 
1.3.2 The Instrumentalist Approach and Phenomenological Modeling 
The distinction between the instrumental method and phenomenological modeling argued for 
by Cartwright et al. is one of breadth.  The instrumental method is where a scientist uses the 
most appropriate tool available to her in order to solve a problem.  In this method, there are 
multiple tools, or instruments, available.  Phenomenological modeling is a way of ordering 
the use of these tools.  Phenomenological modeling is concerned with model construction 
where models are constructed without sole reliance on theory. In this manner, tools and 
models are some of the tools available to scientists in problem solving.  To reflect the theory-
data relationship provided in the last section, we can categorize phenomenological modeling 
as follows: 
𝑑 → 𝑀6, where M is a model representative of the world  (5) 
In accordance with the last equation above, we can see that data sets act as key in model 
creation since models reflect the phenomenon observed.  Scientists may weigh any of the 
factors as they see fit in order to create a best representing model.  This also shows a level of 
autonomy that a model may have from theories since there is not necessarily a direct 
relationship between theory and model with theories being more fundamental; rather, all 
                                                 
6 Note that this arrow is not the same as the implication arrows presented in 1 – 4.2.  This arrow can be known 
as “represented by” for 5 to become: d is represented by M. 
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factors in model creation are weighted individually (Cartwright et al., “Tool Box” 138).  
Even if the theory, T, alone cannot account for a phenomenon captured by the data, d, there 
are other factors, such as the measurements of the phenomenon itself, which can aid in 
model, M, construction. 
Here, we can also revisit the notion of representation, where it is argued by Cartwright et 
al. that theories do not represent the world, rather it is the case that models represent the 
world (“Tool Box” 140).  Indeed, the underdetermination problem arises when considering 
how theories and auxiliaries seemingly imply data in the theory-driven view rather than 
representing it.  Cartwright et al. further argue, “It is the implication in 𝑇 + 𝐴 → 𝑑 that I want 
to challenge.  Theories and auxiliaries do not imply data – or better following Matthias 
Kaiser’s advice in this volume, ‘phenomena’ – even in principle.  Representations of 
phenomena must be constructed and theory is one of the many tools we use for construction” 
(“Tool Box 139).  Due to underdetermination, we would not know which set of theories and 
auxiliaries imply data were the theory-driven view to be supported.  Constructed models, 
however, rather than implying data, represent data.  This representation may be done without 
a heavy reliance on theory if the theory does not match what was expected to be seen in data 
allowing concrete models to have a non-trivial sense of autonomy from theory.  In a sense, 
there are fewer intermediaries between the data set and the model than there are between the 
data set and the theory. 
It is this autonomy from the theory that clashes with the theory-driven view.  In cases of 
phenomenological modeling, the model created is at least autonomous from the prevalent 
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theory of the time.  This autonomy serves as a delineation between the phenomenon-based 
model and the previous theory that could not account for the phenomenon. 
1.4 Similarities and Differences between Cartwright and Kuhn 
To compare the definitions of abstract and concrete offered by Kuhn and Cartwright, it will 
be helpful to understand what Cartwright has to say about Kuhn’s distinctions between 
symbolic generalizations and the manipulations of symbolic generalizations. 
Cartwright argues that the relationship between Kuhn’s symbolic generalizations and 
manipulations is a similar relationship to that between the abstract and the concrete.    This 
comparison between the two schemas allows Cartwright to argue that our understanding of 
symbolic generalizations consist in our understanding of the concrete versions we use to for 
individual cases (“How we Relate Theory to Observation” 262). 
Ideas I will consider in approaching the discussion of the abstract/concrete distinction 
include the significance of both in construction of models as a method of problem solving as 
well as their significance in scientific revolutions.  Let us start with the significance of the 
distinction in general, and move on to their possible significance in revolutions. 
Cartwright defends a Duhemian view where “for most of the symbols of mathematical 
physics, there are no quantities in nature for them to name”, so symbolic formulas need more 
concrete concepts of the laboratory or everyday life to connect them to the physical world 
(“How we Relate Theory to Observation” 265).  This aligns with Kuhn’s argument that 
symbolic generalizations must be manipulated in order for students to learn and ultimately 
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create new manipulations as scientists (Kuhn 188).  In this manner, a significance of concrete 
descriptions is that they are essentially more usable since they pertain directly to the 
experiments for a physical phenomenon. 
I will argue in the next few chapters that the significance of this distinction in scientific 
revolutions is in the switch between which tools are relied upon.  This bolsters Cartwright et 
al.’s arguments for the usefulness of phenomenological models, though it is not an area they 
have discussed.  In normal science, the abstract level can be seen as being relied upon since 
theories assist new scientists in realizing the concrete situations that consist in the abstract.  
The reliance on the abstract in normal science provides the scientist with a foundational 
framework to construct new concrete manipulations to further articulate the paradigm.  This 
reliance shifts to the concrete, however, in times of revolution.  Since the revolution poses a 
crisis that the current foundational abstract cannot solve, scientists must turn to directly 
assessing observations.  Chapters 2 and 3 will present examples to support this argument. 
Let us now consider the way in which Kuhn and Cartwright’s distinctions of the abstract 
and concrete are parallel to the other through both of their discussions on harmonic 
oscillators. 
1.4.1 Manipulations in Harmonic Oscillators 
Both Cartwright and Kuhn present an example of how symbolic generalizations are 
manipulated via the exposition of harmonic oscillators as a concrete example of Newton’s 
second law of motion.  This example provides a sketch of the relationship between symbolic 
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generalizations and their manipulations, and as argued by Cartwright, the relationship 
between the abstract and the concrete. 
Kuhn begins his argument by presenting the drawbacks of working solely with symbolic 
generalizations.  He brings up the example of Newton’s Second Law of Motion, 𝐹 = 𝑚𝑎.  
He argues that in a conversation where Newton’s Second Law is uttered, someone outside of 
the relevant field will not understand the meaning of the expression or how the community of 
scientists attach the expression to nature (Kuhn 187).  One may ultimately ask how these 
scientists have come to agree on this expression, and how they have learned to pick out 
relevant forces, masses, and accelerations (Kuhn 187).  Kuhn continues to argue about the 
importance of a concrete phenomenon in the understanding of these generalizations through 
arguing that when students learn to identify forces, masses, and accelerations in various 
physical situations, the student has learned to design the appropriate version of 𝐹 = 𝑚𝑎, 
where 𝑚 represents mass and 𝑎 represents acceleration, via their exposure to other concrete 
phenomenon.  Some such concrete phenomena include the case of free fall, where 𝐹 = 𝑚𝑎 
becomes 𝐹 =  𝑚𝑔, where 𝑔 is a constant for the approximation of acceleration due to 
gravity, or the case of a simple pendulum, where 𝐹 = 𝑚𝑎 becomes 𝐹 = 𝑚𝑔 sin 𝜃 =
−𝑚𝑙
𝑑2𝜃
𝑑𝑡2
, where 𝑚 is the mass of the pendulum, 𝑙 is the length of the pendulum, and 𝜃 is the 
angular displacement.  With more and more complex situations, the family resemblance 
between these formulae may become harder to discover, so the as the student learns to 
identify forces, masses, and accelerations, they must also become adept at interrelating them 
(Kuhn 188). 
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Cartwright comments on Kuhn’s distinction between the specific manipulations and the 
symbolic generalization of 𝐹 = 𝑚𝑎 using the distinction between the abstract and concrete 
(“How we Relate Theory to Observation” 269).  She adapts German playwright Gotthold 
Lessing’s thoughts on fables to an argument regarding models.  She argues that the 
manipulations posited by Kuhn are in fact models that contain exactly the information 
needed in order to provide a concrete form for the force.  Using Lessing’s analogy of fables 
and models, she argues that for us to clearly understand the abstract law of motion, we 
require concrete cases where it can be applied (“How we Relate Theory to Observation” 268-
269).  Her adaptation emphasizes the idea of fitting out abstract concepts of force, mass, and 
acceleration using concrete concepts.  She argues, “I may give you the abstract advice ‘Be 
careful,’ but until you know more concretely what being careful consists in for different 
situations, this will be of little help to you” (“How we Relate Theory to Observation” 270). In 
this manner, the expression 𝐹 = 𝑚𝑎 is unhelpful for the scientist until they know what 
concrete phenomenon to apply it to.  The specific formula for harmonic oscillators assist in 
the understanding of the Second Law of Motion. 
1.4.2 Definition of “Abstract” and “Concrete” 
Thus far, I have used the terms “abstract”, “concrete”, “symbolic generalizations”, “theory-
driven”, and “phenomenological” to represent a variety of ideas.  Before moving on, let us 
discuss and differentiate these terms in relation to each other. 
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1.4.2.1 The Abstract, Theory-Driven, and Symbolic Generalizations 
Kuhn describes symbolic generalizations as mathematical formulations of fundamental 
theories.  These symbolic generalizations are the most general, mathematical manner7 in 
which a theory can be described.  For instance, 𝐹 = 𝑚𝑎 is the symbolic generalization Kuhn 
used to describe Newtonian motion.  This is similar to Cartwright’s consideration of the 
abstract, as presented in “Fables and Models,” where she argues that the abstract concepts of 
physics ought to be viewed as general descriptions similar to the general notion of success or 
work.  Cartwright also presents the notion of the scientific abstract in “Tool Box”, where she 
discusses the prevalence of fundamental theories in model creation.  
Cartwright et al. use the term theory-driven to denote a method of model creation that 
relies solely or extremely heavily on the use of a fundamental theory.  This theory may be in 
mathematical terms (as mentioned previously about Newtonian motion).  In “How we Relate 
Theory to Observation”, Cartwright further argues that her notion of the abstract and Kuhn’s 
notion of symbolic generalizations have similar meanings (262).  The abstract level and 
symbolic generalizations are the general ways of describing fundamental scientific theories.  
Theory-driven, on the other hand, is a manner in which the abstract theories can be used in 
model creation.  As such, theory-driven views are ones that rely greatly on the abstract when 
problem solving through model creation and use. 
                                                 
7 Note that Kuhn does not discuss many non-physics examples, so mathematical formulations may not exhaust 
what he described to be symbolic generalizations. 
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1.4.2.2 The Concrete and the Phenomenological 
While Kuhn uses the phrase “manipulations,” Cartwright argues that these manipulations are 
analogous to her notion of the concrete in the sense that these manipulations “fill out” 
general theories.  Kuhn’s outline of the manipulations involve specific instances of his 
category of symbolic generalizations.  In this manner, the concrete involves specific 
applications of 𝐹 = 𝑚𝑎 such as those of free fall and simple pendulums presented in section 
1.4.1.  Indeed, he discusses the concrete applications in harmonic oscillators distinct from 
simply the abstract of Newtonian motion.  In this manner, the concrete refers to the specific 
phenomenon in occurrence. 
The descriptor “phenomenological” is used by Cartwright et al. to describe a method of 
modeling that is not reliant entirely on theory.  Instead, phenomenological modeling relies on 
the concrete phenomenon to construct models for problem solving.  In a similar manner that 
symbolic generalizations and the abstract are general ways of describing theories, the 
concrete is a general manner of describing a specific case of phenomenon.  Whereas, 
phenomenological modeling is the manner in which scientists may use the concrete in model 
creation. 
1.5 Other Considerations of the Abstract/Concrete Distinction 
Other philosophers have approached the relationship between theory and observation through 
commenting on experimentation and the way in which scientific controversies may be 
resolved.  Due to their focus on a discussion of models within the abstract/concrete 
discussion, the views discussed here include those of Rinat Nugaev and Samuel Schindler. 
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1.5.1 Nugaev on Mathematical Formalizations 
Nugaev presents the distinction between the empirical and theoretical as an issue to be 
addressed in the theoretical reconstruction of paradigm shifts in his work, “Basic Paradigm 
Change: The Conception of Communicative Rationality” (23).  Nugaev presents a notion that 
scientists utilize mathemathical formalizations of old theories to “guess” future theories.  He 
comments about the decline of the use of mechanical models in physics giving way to the 
rise of mathematical formalizations.  He argues, “In [Maxwell’s] dynamical analogy, applied 
to the theory of the electromagnetic field, [he] broke away from the use of concrete 
mechanisms of interaction and rose to a higher level of theoretical abstraction.” (25)  This 
exposits what Nugaev dubs as the mathematical hypothesis, where the future theories that 
“guessed” only reach empirical interpretation after a long path of trial and error (25).   
This is a similar manner of classifying the abstract as Kuhn’s symbolic generalizations.  
Symbolic generalizations are the mathematical formalizations of a foundational theory.  
Nugaev’s argument of the decline of mechanical models shows a larger rift between 
experimentalists and theorists of science.  While this rift will be briefly discussed in Chapter 
3, it is important to note that Nugaev’s argument of empirical interpretations coming to 
fruition via trial and error is similar to the way in which problem solving occurs during 
periods of normal science.  Nugaev agrees with Kuhn on paradigm shifts occurring with a 
transition between the different theories such as the transition from classical dynamics to 
relativity and quantum theory (24). 
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1.5.2 Schindler on Theory-Laden Experiments 
The abstract/concrete distinction can also be seen in Samuel Schindler’s “Theory-laden 
Experimentation”.  Schindler outlines three difficulties of the manner in which theory is 
inescapable in the conversation of experiments and observations.  The three difficulties are:  
1. Theories impact on perceptual processes so that ‘what we 
see’ is partially determined by our theoretical presuppositions. 
2. Observations cannot be described in a theory-neutral way 
and the meaning of observational terms is determined by 
theoretical presuppositions. 3. Theories make certain 
observations more salient than others because some 
observations are just more interesting from a certain theoretical 
perspective than others. (Schindler 1)   
Using the three difficulties in teasing theory apart from experiments, Schindler argues that 
theories are valuable when data conflicts in experiments occur.   
These difficulties and Schindler’s ultimate conclusion can resonate well with both Kuhn 
and Cartwright’s arguments regarding the abstract/concrete distinction.  Difficulty 1 is 
similar to the gestalt theory posed by Kuhn, where scientists working within a paradigm see 
the world differently than those working with a different paradigm.  Difficulty 1 is a case 
brought up both in normal science and paradigm shifts.  Difficulties 2 and 3 show the 
connectivity between the abstract and the concrete.  While Kuhn and Cartwright argue (using 
their own terminologies) that the concrete fills out the abstract by making discussions of the 
abstract meaningful (discussion of an abstract level must be accompanied by the discussion 
of the concrete), Schindler argues that the abstract is required to make discussions of the 
concrete useful.  Indeed, this does not conflict with Kuhn or Cartwright’s views when 
looking at normal science.  However, when understanding this distinction during times of 
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revolution, a more nuanced view need be adopted.  As I will present through the examples in 
the following chapters, concrete models may be created with little reference to theory when 
the paradigmatic theory cannot account for a phenomenon. It is also the case that these 
concrete models may ultimately aid in the development and acceptance of a future theory.  
As such, while the abstract may be required to make discussions of the concrete useful in 
times of normal science, this requirement is minimalized during times of crisis.  Difficulty 3 
and Schindler’s ultimate argument are relevant to the Tool Box method described by 
Cartwright et al.  It may indeed be the case that theories make certain data more salient.  
Following the tool box method, it may even be appropriate to sometimes use theories in order 
to adjudicate between conflicting data sets.  However, as presented in Cartwright’s case 
study, the issue of a conflict between expected data and occurring phenomenon in 
superconductivity was not settled via theory.  In this manner, while theory does indeed have 
the ability to play a role in model creation, it is not necessary to rely mostly on theories 
during times of crises. 
While these views are important in situating the debate around the role of the 
abstract/concrete distinction, I will focus on Cartwright and Kuhn’s distinctions due to 
Cartwright’s pre-existing discussion about the case study of superconductivity as well as her 
pre-existing comparison between herself and Kuhn. 
1.6 Summary 
I have now outlined the abstract/concrete distinction as presented by Kuhn and Cartwright.  I 
have also shown that Cartwright generally agrees with theory/observation distinction 
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presented by Kuhn through comparing their presentations of harmonic oscillators.  I have 
also presented other views that discuss this abstract/concrete distinction in times of transition 
between paradigms. 
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Chapter 2 
The London-London Model 
2.1 Introduction 
Scientists may move from a heavy reliance on the abstract to a heavy reliance on the concrete 
in model construction during times of scientific crisis.  This reliance shift occurs when 
abstract components of a paradigm cannot account for a new anomaly.  To illustrate how this 
reliance can change during times of crisis, let us consider the development of the London-
London model of superconductivity alongside the development of BCS theory of 
superconductivity.   
I will begin with the development of the London-London model in light of the Meissner 
effect, and a timeline of this development can be found in Appendix A.  I will endorse 
Cartwright et al.’s view that reliance on the abstract was abandoned by the London brothers 
in the development of the London-London model.  By this, I mean that since the previously 
established theory that was based on Maxwell’s equations could not account for the Meissner 
effect, the London brothers had to turn their attention to the concrete phenomena of a lack of 
“frozen-in” magnetic field as a basis for model construction.  This section will first present 
the history of the development of this model, then discuss the application of the 
abstract/concrete distinction. 
I will argue that, while Cartwright et al.’s emphasis on actual use of phenomenological 
models in problem solving was correct, it must be fit within a Kuhnian framework to fully 
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understand its role in the transition between paradigms.  I will also argue that in its problem 
solving role during a time of crisis, this concretely developed model may be temporary, 
which was a critique of Cartwright et al.’s account of phenomenological models, but this 
temporariness does not conflict with its necessity.  
In the next chapter, I will show that a reliance on the concrete level arose once again in the 
development and acceptance of the BCS theory, which serves as an explanation of the low 
energy state of superconducting materials, through Bardeen’s focus on the phenomenon of 
the energy difference between a material’s superconducting and non-superconducting states. 
2.2 History 
2.2.1 Pre-London Brothers 
In the early 1900s, successes in the quantum theory of metals, such as the development of 
Bloch’s theory of a wave function of an electron in metal, led theoretical physicists to be 
optimistic about the tools for explaining superconductivity (Hoddeson 141).  Bloch’s early 
quantum theory of metals began to be applied in new areas of solid state physics, 
superconductivity included.  However, theories such as relativistic electrons, spontaneous 
current theories, and “trapped” electrons did not explain the characteristic loss of resistivity 
of superconductors (Hoddeson 141).   
The Meissner effect was discovered in 1933 by experimentalists Walther Meissner and 
Robert Oschenfeld.  When a solid cylinder of tin or lead was cooled below its 
superconducting transition point in a constant magnetic field, the magnetic field within the 
  27 
material was suddenly expelled from the metal (Kragh 376).  This effect and the 
diamagnetic8 character of superconductors were not predicted by previous theoretical 
models.  This experimental discovery showed how future experimentalists can focus on the 
issues of superconductivity not readily answered by theory. 
2.2.2 London Brothers 
Fritz and Heinz London went against the grain of theoretical frameworks of the time by 
utilizing quantum phenomena at the macroscopic level to explain superconductivity 
(Matricon and Waysand 67).  Prior to work with his brother, Fritz London collaborated with 
Walter Heitler to calculate the binding between two hydrogen atoms in a hydrogen molecule 
as the first quantum mechanical approach to the chemical bond (Matricon and Waysand 67).  
Marking this time as a turning point in London’s intellectual pre-occupations, he and his 
brother began work on a macroscopic theory of superconductivity.  The London-London 
model arose with the need to explain the Meissner effect, which was unexplained through 
previous electromagnetism theories and was not yet handled by new quantum theories such 
as Bloch’s.  Superconductors, materials that exhibit unique conductive behaviour under 
certain circumstances have two observable findings: resistance-less conductivity and the 
Meissner effect (Cartwright et al., “Tool Box” 143).  The Meissner effect is the expulsion of 
magnetic flux in a superconducting material.  An observational effect of this is a seeming act 
of levitation when a magnet is placed above a superconductor.  The Meissner effect 
                                                 
8 Diamagnetism is a quantum mechanical effect that occurs in all materials.  Diamagnetic materials create an 
induced magnetic field in a direction opposite to an externally applied magnetic field, and they are repelled by 
the applied magnetic field.  A perfect diamagnet expels all magnetic fields due to the Meissner effect. 
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suggested that the fundamental character of superconductivity is one of perfect diamagnetism 
rather than a vanishing resistivity (Hoddeson 142).   
An initial theory explaining the findings of superconductive material prior to the discovery 
of the Meissner effect was an acceleration equation based upon Maxwell’s equations to 
account for a stationary current flowing at a constant rate in the absence of electric fields 
(Cartwright et al., “Tool Box” 145).  This equation, however, was shown by the London 
brothers to be unable to account for the Meissner effect, where the magnetic field within the 
conducting material is expelled and the material appears to exhibit diamagnetism (Bueno et 
al., “Returning to the London Account” 99). 
Not only could the previous equation based on electromagnetism not account for the 
Meissner effect, but it directly contradicted the existence of the Meissner effect.  The 
previous theories of electromagnetism drew analogies from ferromagnetism to hypothesize 
that an outside magnetic field would be “frozen-in” when a material reaches superconducting 
state.  The material, however, expels magnetic flux rather than having its initial flux “frozen-
in” after it reaches superconducting state (Bueno et al., “Models and Structures” 45).  Since 
the previous equation did not predict the occurrence of the Meissner effect, its experimental 
discovery marks the start of the shift in reliance from the abstract level to the concrete level 
within the topic of superconductivity. 
2.3 The Development of the London-London Model 
A new model had to be created to account for the Meissner effect.  This new model 
abandoned the acceleration equation of electromagnetism and proposed a new “fundamental 
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law” of superconductivity (Cartwright et al., “Tool Box” 147).  Since this model was 
constructed with the phenomenon of the Meissner effect as a motivation, this model has been 
dubbed a phenomenological model in “Tool Box”.  This new model directly utilized 
information resulting from the observed phenomenon rather than solely relying on the 
defunct theory. 
The previous model of superconductivity referred to by Cartwright was built upon an 
acceleration equation, Λ
𝑑𝐽
𝑑𝑡
= ?⃗?, where Λ is a constant that depends on the mass, charge, and 
number density of electrons, ?⃗? is the electric field, and  𝐽 is the current density , that could 
account for a stationary current flowing at a constant rate in the absence of electric fields by 
setting ?⃗? = 0, which modifies the equation to 
𝑑𝐽
𝑑𝑡
= 0  (Cartwright et al., “Tool Box” 145).  
London and London realized that this equation contradicted the Meissner effect.  Using a 
constraint on the magnetic field inside the superconductor and integrating with respect to 
time, the equation for the constraint on the magnetic field becomes Λ𝑐2∇2(?⃗⃗? − 𝐻0⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗) = ?⃗⃗? −
𝐻0⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗., where ?⃗⃗? is the magnetic field, 𝐻0⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗ is the magnetic field at time = 0 (possibly before the 
transition phase has occurred).   All possible solutions to this equation involve an initial 
magnetic field within the superconductor.  This is was, however, simply not the case since all 
magnetic fields within the superconductor are expelled due to the Meissner effect. 
The general solution means, therefore, that practically the 
original field persists for ever in the supraconductor.  The field 
𝐻0⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗ is to be regarded as ‘frozen in’ and represents a permanent 
memory of the field which existed when the metal was last 
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cooled below the transition temperature. (Cartwright et al., 
“Tool Box” 146) 
Given the initial acceleration equation, with no initial field or flux in the superconducting 
material, after the transition to the superconducting domain, we expect there to be no change 
to the lack of initial field or flux in the superconductor.  In the case of an initial field, 
however, the initial acceleration equation predicts that there will be a non-zero amount of 
magnetic flux within the superconductor.  The Meissner effect, however, shows that there is 
the flux within the superconductor is expelled, and directly contradicts the theory’s 
predictions (Cartwright et al., “Tool Box” 147). 
In order to account for the lack of a frozen-in magnetic flux in the superconductor, the 
London brothers gave precedence to their observations rather than the predictions of the 
defunct theory.  The London brothers developed two London equations, 
𝑑𝑗𝑠
𝑑𝑡
=
𝑛𝑠𝑒
2
𝑚
𝐸 and 
∇𝑗𝑠 = −
𝑛𝑠𝑒
2
𝑚𝑐
𝐵, where 𝑗𝑠 is the superconducting current density, 𝑒 is the charge of an electron 
and proton, 𝑚 is electron mass, 𝑛𝑠 is a constant associated with a number density of 
superconducting carries, 𝐵 is the magnetic field within the superconductor, and 𝐸 is the 
electric field within the superconductor.  In accounting for the expulsion magnetic fields in 
superconducting materials, both 𝐵 and 𝐸 were set to 0 since there are no magnetic and 
electric fields within the superconductor as a result of the Meissner effect (Matricon and 
Waysand 71).  These equations can be written as a London equation in terms of a vector 
potential, so they will be hereby referred to as the London equation.  As argued by 
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Cartwright, this development occurred through relying on the phenomenon itself rather than 
previous theories in order to account for the Meissner effect. 
This example shows not only a method of creation for phenomenological models, but also 
how theory-driven models may react to unexpected results.  Since theory-driven models must 
keep theory in a dominant position, when encountering unexpected phenomenon, old models 
may add in correction terms to comply with both the original theory and the new 
phenomenon or place a restriction on an auxiliary assumption (Cartwright et al., “Tool Box” 
148).  The London account, however, took neither of these options, and instead created a new 
equation not derived from the original acceleration equation.  We see here the emphasis on 
the actual method of model creation by scientists in “Tool Box”.  This argument for the 
existence of phenomenological models may be construed as descriptive in nature.  The 
following sections will deal with arguments against the phenomenological modeling method 
along with my argument that this form of modeling fits well within a Kuhnian framework of 
paradigm shifts. 
The difference in importance of theory and phenomenon arose in the development of this 
model of superconductivity.   
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2.4 The Case Study of Superconductivity in the Philosophy of Science 
Literature 
It is important to note that the revolution in superconductivity9 involving the London-London 
model has been presented and analyzed by Cartwright and other philosophers.  I will briefly 
discuss their analysis to show that, while I do not disagree with their analysis, further study 
must be done to fully fit this case study within the context of the revolution.  I will also show 
that, while their emphasis on the actual use of phenomenological methods by scientists was 
correct, it does not fully account for this method of problem solving during a revolution. 
2.4.1 An Assessment of Cartwright and the London-London Model 
To assess how Cartwright’s phenomenological modeling may fit into a process of paradigm 
shifts, we can view the shift from pre-Meissner effect superconductivity to the London 
account as an anomaly recognition that led to the start of a paradigm shift from macroscopic 
theories to quantum theories.  Indeed, this macro-micro move is something amenable to 
critics of Cartwright: Steven French, James Ladyman, Otavio Bueno, and Newton Da Costa 
(hereby: FLBD) (Bueno et al., “Returning to the London Account” 99). 
The initial acceleration equation not being able to account for the Meissner effect alludes 
to an anomaly in the original paradigm present in superconductivity.  With magnetic fields 
                                                 
9 It may be contentious as to whether or not there truly was a revolution in superconductivity. However, given 
my discussion of Kuhn’s definition of a revolution, I have assumed that the multiple issues in explaining 
superconductivity (first, through the Meissner effect, and later, the difference in energy between a material’s 
superconducting and non-superconducting states) amounts to enough anomalies that render the original 
paradigm of electromagnetic equations defunct.  The ultimate shift to explaining superconductivity through 
quantum means is distinct enough from the original electromagnetic explanations to warrant the title of a 
revolution. 
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being expelled rather than frozen-in, the superconducting material not only did not cohere 
with the acceleration equation, but in fact could not cohere with it.  This strict contradiction 
between the phenomenon and expectations of the theory at the time show how this may be 
seen as a critical anomaly in the field. 
The acceleration equation was able to account for what FLBD may dub as “macro-
structures”, but the current theories of electron pairing required the shift to utilizing “micro-
structures” (Bueno et al., “Returning” 99).  Moving from the acceleration equation to the 
London equation provides a shift from the explanatory macroscopic interpretation to a 
microscopic one that sets out a program for generating quantum models (Bueno et al., 
“Returning” 100).  With the London equation still in use within electromagnetism, the 
Meissner effect compelled us to understand the behavior of electrons that were not explained 
by Bloch’s theory of metals.  Fritz London’s solo paper explicitly considering the 
diamagnetic atom shows how the London-London model may be considered microscopic 
(Bueno et al. “Returning” 100). 
The London account’s creation was likely not motivated by the deterrence of ad hoc 
additions or restrictions in the theory-driven view.  Rather, this model was generated simply 
due to the need to account for a phenomenon that was not being accounted for in the previous 
model.  The previous model’s tools relied heavily on theories, but the new model shifts this 
reliance on to the phenomenon itself. 
This shift in focus of research shows the manner in which the world views of scientists in 
the field may change.  What was once explained via the Lorentz force and eddy currents 
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would need to be re-evaluated to fit the discovered processes of superconducting material.  
The shift in world view is not necessarily as dramatic as a gestalt shift, but Kuhn himself 
distances the paradigm shift from a gestalt shift in later work (See Kuhn, “Possible Worlds” 
49 qtd. in Hacking 276).  Distancing himself from a severe gestalt shift, Kuhn further 
discussed smaller scale revolutions such as the discovery of minor planets in 1801 not being 
a full scale change in astronomical paradigm (Kuhn 116). 
2.4.2 Criticisms of Cartwright 
Major critics of the phenomenological modeling regarding the London-London model 
presented in “Tool Box” include FLBD.  FLBD’s arguments against this type of 
phenomenological modeling consisted of their emphasis on a partial structures account, the 
issue of temporality in phenomenological models, and the issue that Fritz London himself 
was wanting to divest from a phenomenological framework (qtd. in Bueno et al., “Theories 
versus Models” 69).  While I will briefly address their argument about partial structures, my 
focus will be on their concern regarding Fritz London and the autonomy and temporariness 
of models from the abstract theory. 
2.4.2.1 The Definition of “Phenomenological” 
One of the criticisms of Cartwright’s work is that Fritz London situated the London account 
outside of the phenomenological framework. London explicitly denied that his model was 
phenomenological.  London’s denial of the phenomenological framework of the London-
London model would undermine the phenomenological method of model building and 
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Cartwright et al.’s emphasis on the notion that phenomenological model building is actually 
used in science.  However, as Cartwright and Suarez rebut in “Theories – Tools vs. Models”, 
there may be multiple uses of the phrase phenomenological10 (70).  London primarily uses it 
to denote relying solely on measurements gathered on the phenomenon; whereas Cartwright 
et al. use it to denote models that are not constructed in a theory-driven manner.  Cartwright 
and Suarez argue that relying solely on measurements does not necessitate the construction 
of models outside of a theory-driven view, so that definition of phenomenological does not 
cohere with their own.  While this is true, it is also not necessary that all models constructed 
of measurements must belong to a theory-driven view, so there may be some room for 
compatibility with the instrumental account in “Tool Box”.  Measurements and predictions 
derived from a general theory may not be amenable to testing; however, measurements 
gathered from observation of phenomena are not entirely theory-driven, and also do not have 
same restrictions in testing since the data was presumably gathered from practical tests.  In 
this manner, the measurements London speaks of as phenomenological may not be 
phenomenological in Cartwright’s terms at all. 
Without relying solely on measurements as Fritz London argues, but still focusing on the 
phenomenon that is observed for the construction of their model, the London-London model 
is still phenomenological in the way that Cartwright et al. define the term.  Since this paper is 
concerned with the focus on the concrete rather than solely measurements, a feature of the 
                                                 
10 They also briefly dwell on their own minimal usage of the phrase phenomenological that arises only twice in 
Tool Box.   
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phenomenon in question, London’s avoidance of what he defined to be phenomenological 
does not show an avoidance of the concrete. 
2.4.2.2 The Partial Structures Argument 
FLBD’s criticisms also stem from their endorsement of a partial structures argument for the 
relation between theories and models.  Under their argument for partial structures, 
mathematical structures and physical structures may be partially isomorphic (Bueno et al., 
“Models and Structures” 45).  The partial structures account holds that there are some 
relevant features shared between theories and models that may be represented in a set-
theoretic manner (Bueno et al., “Models and Structures” 45).  This implies that models are 
not entirely autonomous from theories since relevant features may account for any 
isomorphism.  This aspect of the criticism, however, is not entirely contradictory to the 
instrumentalist emphasis placed by Cartwright, Suarez and Shomar.  In using theories as a 
tool, there may be a partial structure overlap between theories and models, but this does not 
necessitate that theories always be relied upon as a tool.  Similar to the manner in which a 
hammer is the perfect tool for a nail, but not the perfect tool for a screw, a theory may be the 
perfect tool for model creation for some phenomenon, but not the perfect tool in other 
situations.  In this manner, both parties have agreed that the instrumentalist approach and the 
partial structures account are not necessarily mutually exclusive (Cartwright et al., “Tools 
versus Models” 63, “Models and Structures” 45). However, Cartwright and Suarez also argue 
that this partial structures method does not figure into the London account since the new and 
old models have no partial isomorphism.  While this ongoing debate may see an opportunity 
  37 
to fit within the Kuhnian framework, I will set this issue aside and focus my attention in this 
thesis on the issue of the temporariness of phenomenological modeling. 
2.4.2.3 Temporariness 
A criticism of the phenomenological approach to model construction also noted that 
phenomenological models are at best temporary.  It is less contested that the London-London 
model may be autonomous from the theory of the previous acceleration equation, but it may 
not be the case that it remains autonomous from future theories in that it may be applied to 
further explain a different, new theory (Bueno et al., “Representing the Relationship” 515-
516).  Phenomenological models seem temporary since their autonomy from theory rests on 
the prevalence of a certain theory at the time of its creation. 
Indeed, it may be the case that the London-London model’s autonomy from theory was 
temporary as it was ultimately considered alongside other high-level theoretical and 
mathematical considerations (Bueno et al., “Representing the Relationship” 516).  A model’s 
autonomy, however, short lived, can still be of use when considering its place in the start of a 
paradigm shift.  In fact, without autonomy, phenomenological models of the London sort 
cannot account for the anomalies of a paradigm. 
The temporariness of phenomenological models also shows the case-by-case nature of this 
account.  It is not necessary that all modeling methods switch to being phenomenological.  
Rather, that domains may adopt this method of modeling when the current method of 
modeling does not assist in problem solving.  In this manner, the London-London model can 
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assist in problem solving to account for the Meissner effect when the previous model of the 
acceleration equation cannot. 
An issue that will be later expanded upon is the difference in level of autonomy and 
temporariness between the London-London model and the later BCS theory of 
superconductivity.  It is the case that the London-London model did not connect to future 
theories in the same way that BCS theory did.  The London-London model presented the 
quantum, but macroscopic equation of the Meissner effect.  However, with budding prevalent 
quantum theories of the time, including Bloch’s theory of metals, unable to account for 
superconducting metals, this model remained a mostly autonomous solution to the Meissner 
effect. 
2.5 Reliance on the Abstract 
Let us recall that prior to the London account, theories of superconductivity were largely 
based on variations of Maxwell’s equations as well as theories used for semi-conductors 
from the quantum theory of metals.  In attempts to explain his experimental observations, 
Heinz London developed a phenomenological theory of superconductivity.  This theory 
contained the important idea that super-currents flow in a small but finite penetration depth.  
Coupled with theories of De Haas-Lorentz, Becker, Heller and Sauter, the London brothers 
set out trying to account for the infinite direct current conductivity by assuming that metals 
were perfect conductors.  However, this led to a dependence on magnetic field theory, a 
result now unsuitable due to Meissner’s results (Hoddeson 502 – 503).  Given the budding 
  39 
quantum theory of metals by Bloch, the abstract components of the London account can be 
seen through both the influence of electromagnetism and early quantum mechanics. 
Areas of reliance on the abstract are seen through the previous dependence on microscopic 
principles as well as the later development of a quantum theory in the postulation of electron 
coupling.  The development of electron coupling will be discussed in the next chapter 
regarding BCS theory.  Prior to the development of quantum mechanics, theories of 
superconductivity were limited to microscopic principles of single electron theories.  Armed 
with the successes of the quantum theory of metals in ferromagnetism, “[many theoretical 
physicists] were optimistic that the new tool would also help them to explain 
superconductivity” (Hoddeson 141).  The initial quantum theory of metals led physicists to 
search for experimental information on superconductors by establishing cryogenic 
laboratories in Toronto and Leiden (Hoddeson 141).  Here, Meissner discovered that the 
purest single crystals of some normal metal conductors, like gold, do not necessarily become 
superconducting when cooled down (Hoddeson 141).  This, coupled with the discovery of 
the Meissner effect, alluded to the breakdown of the initial microscopic quantum theory of 
metals posited by Bloch as a plausible theory of superconductivity. 
Indeed, London comments on the reliance of Bloch’s theory of metals in 
superconductivity: 
It seems that the principal obstacle which stands in the way of 
understanding this phenomenon is to be sought in its customary 
macroscopical interpretation as a kind of limiting case of 
ordinary conductivity. The present theoretical situation may be 
characterized in such a way that it is rigorously demonstrable 
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that, on the basis of the recognized conceptions of the electron 
theory of metals, a theory of supraconductivity is impossible—
provided that the phenomenon is interpreted in the usual way 
(London, 1935, p. 24 qtd. In Bueno et al., “Empirical Factors 
and Structural Transference”, pg 97) 
The “electron theory of metals” London refers to is the theory of metals developed by 
Bloch.  This theory gained traction and saw use in the modeling of semiconductors as well as 
ferromagnetism (Hoddeson 141).  However, this theory, in addition to the use of 
electromagnetism in metals, could not explain the observable phenomenon tackled by the 
London brothers.  This realization led to the move to place reliance on the concrete during a 
time of crisis. 
2.6 Reliance on the Concrete 
According to both Kuhn and Cartwright, concrete models are easier for scientists to use than 
the abstract levels. By this, we mean that concrete models can have more uses in teaching as 
well as in gathering new information.  By this, we can now begin to see the move to the 
importance of the concrete in the London-London account.  The model assisted in gathering 
new information about the Meissner effect that could not have been previously accounted for.  
The London-London model lent itself to explaining the Meissner effect by focusing on 
observations in a way that the previous theory-driven view could not. 
2.6.1 Concrete and Phenomenological 
The London-London model is phenomenological since the London brothers constructed their 
model of superconductivity with close attention to observations of expelled magnetic fields – 
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and because they rejected theory as it was not a useful tool.  This model is also a concrete 
model since it directly relates to problem solving for one class of phenomenon – 
superconductivity - in light of the Meissner effect.  In this section, I will show how the 
London-London model fits both Kuhn and Cartwright’s characterizations of the concrete in 
addition to being considered a phenomenological model by Cartwright.   
Kuhn’s account of the abstract, using his terms, showed the utility of the symbolic 
generalizations to many specific situations; in particular, his definition of the concrete 
included the application of the model to a specific situation as well as utility in teaching via 
that model.  As such, the London-London model is concrete due to its application to the 
specific situation of superconductivity, which may be further specified into the specific 
purpose of solving the issue of the Meissner effect that the previous theory based on 
Maxwell’s equations could not.  The London-London model could have also been utilized in 
teaching physics students with the London equation. 
2.7 The Shift from Abstract to Concrete 
The London brothers themselves rejected the foundational theory preceding their own 
experiments.  This rejection marked the beginning of the revolution in superconductivity, 
where the previous abstract generalization could not be utilized to solve a crucial problem.  
By creating a phenomenological model, the London brothers relied on the concrete, specific 
observations with greater importance.  This section will discuss this move in further detail by 
arguing that the London-London model plays an important role in time of crisis because it is 
both concrete and phenomenological. 
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In their 1935 paper, the London brothers begin with the acceleration equation for the older 
model of superconductivity (qtd. in Bueno et al., “Empirical Factors and Structure 
Transference 98).  This equation used part of Maxwell’s theory to obtain its result and was 
associated with models of ferromagnetism.  This acceleration equation represents a magnetic 
field that must be “frozen-in” the superconductor.  The Meissner experiment, however, 
falsified this by showing that there is no freezing in of magnetic fields as this magnetic field 
is instead expelled.  The London brothers created the “homogenous equation” that 
represented their abandonment of the old acceleration model in order to account for the lack 
of a frozen-in magnetic field. 
The rejection of the old theory shows the move away from placing importance on the 
previous abstract component of the old paradigm.  The new fundamental law seen through 
the new equation shows the move to a new abstract level of a paradigm.  The time between 
these different abstract levels, however, was captured by the actual use of the concrete level 
in model construction. 
2.7.1 Problem Solving 
Similar to the instrumentalist notion that theories are but one tool in the tool box of science, I 
argue that placing a changing reliance on the abstract and the concrete during times of crises 
can be regarded as another tool in the tool box.  My extended version of instrumental 
problem solving is similar to but more comprehensive than Cartwright et al.’s account of 
phenomenological modeling.  While in “Tool Box”, Cartwright et al. mention the use of the 
phenomenon without the necessary reliance on the abstract, they do not address how moving 
  43 
between the concrete and the abstract levels can show a long term approach to problem 
solving.   
In a time of crisis, the normal, abstract components of a paradigm cannot account for the 
unsolved puzzles.  As such, importance in model building, or other methods of problem 
solving, move from the defunct abstract level of a paradigm to a focus on the concrete model 
that describes a phenomenon.  Once the phenomenon can be accounted for, newer theories 
may be constructed to enter work within a new scientific paradigm.  In this manner, as the 
old paradigm breaks down into a crisis state, it is more useful to utilize concrete phenomenon 
for problem solving; when the original anomaly has been accounted for, scientists may once 
again construct and utilize theories to form the abstract levels of a new paradigm under 
which to conduct normal science. 
The London-London model accounted for the Meissner effect without requiring the use of 
the defunct abstract level of the previous paradigm that applied to superconductivity.  While 
this temporary model was ultimately overshadowed by its successors including modern day 
BCS theory in 1957, its role in problem solving when previous theories failed was crucial to 
the development of superconductivity. 
2.8 Conclusion 
I have agreed with Cartwright et al. on the matter that the London-London model of 
superconductivity was developed via reliance on the concrete level.  To further the 
instrumentalist method, I have argued that the shift in reliance on the abstract level to the 
reliance on the concrete level was used as a method of accounting for the Meissner effect. I 
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have also presented preceding theories of superconductivity that were based on Maxwell’s 
equations, and I have argued that the London-London model differs from those theories by 
being a concretely developed model.  I have exposited previous philosophical discussions by 
Cartwright et al. and FLBD regarding the London-London model’s phenomenological and 
temporary development, and I have defended Cartwright et al.’s instrumentalist method by 
arguing that, while the model is indeed temporary, it has a crucial role in problem solving 
during a time of crisis.  With an emphasis on the move from the abstract level to the concrete 
level as a method of problem solving during crises, I have applied the Kuhnian framework to 
show that the London-London model assisted in accounting for an anomaly that could not be 
accounted for using the abstract level of electromagnetism or early quantum theory 
paradigms.  My arguments show that concretely developed models are useful in not just 
representing a phenomenon unaccountable for via theory, but also in continuing the problem 
solving nature of science. 
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Chapter 3 
BCS Theory 
3.1 Introduction 
After the London-London model, scientists working within superconductivity developed the 
Ginzburg-Landau model in 1950 and the later BCS theory in 1957 for a microphysical theory 
of superconductivity.  The development of BCS theory is similar to that of the London-
London model in that both rely on a concrete level for problem solving.  The problem 
needing to be solved in this case is the fact that materials exhibit a surprisingly low energy 
level when in superconducting state.  In this chapter, I will show that Bardeen, Cooper, and 
Schrieffer resolve this issue by relying on the phenomenon to posit Cooper pairs. 
First I will discuss the role of experimentalists in superconductivity after the success of the 
London-London model.  I will show that, while I and the creators of BCS theory classify it as 
an ultimately concrete focused theory, its reliance on the experimental phenomenon is called 
into question since its discovery of Cooper pairs can be applicable to superfluidity, an area 
outside of superconductivity.  
After drawing the developmental parallel between BCS theory and the London-London 
model, I will then show that, while BCS theory is more “theory-like” than the London-
London model, it still relied on the concrete level to develop a solution for the energy 
difference in states problem.  Finally, I will show that BCS theory is concrete but not 
phenomenological to show that Cartwright et al.’s instrumental method applies to a greater 
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class of models than the ones proposed in “Tool Box”.  It is important to note that while the 
London-London model has been discussed in the philosophy of science literature extensively, 
the abstract/concrete distinction in the development of BCS theory has not been 
comprehensively explored.  Cartwright has discussed BCS theory briefly in her 1999 book, 
Dappled World; however, that focuses on the domain of quantum theory, whereas, this thesis 
focuses on its presence in the abstract-concrete distinction. 
3.2 Experimentalists in Superconductivity 
Prior to the paper on BCS theory’s publication, beginning in 1951, an anti-theoretical tone 
began to gain ground amongst experimentalists within the field of superconductivity due to 
the advances made by earlier models, including the London-London model, which accounted 
for the phenomena without pandering to a failed theory.  Bernd Matthias, a German-
American physicist and chemist credited with discovering numerous types of ferro-electrics, 
set out to search for superconducting materials with higher critical temperatures (Bromberg 
3).  High temperature superconductors can see more practical applications than low 
temperature superconductors due to fewer resources being expended in keeping a super 
cooled temperature.  Matthias, by the time of his death, helped establish a record for the 
highest recorded critical temperature of 23K.  This result was cited by Bardeen when he 
received his Nobel Prize for superconductivity research in 1972.  Matthias’ focus on 
experimental data shows the lasting effect, from the 1950s to the 1980s, that the temporary 
switch in focus from the abstract level to the concrete level has had in the field of physics. 
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After its development, BCS theory’s allegiance to the concrete was called into question by 
Matthias. 
With the BCS theory, Matthias now saw the results he had 
achieved within the field of superconductivity demoted in 
importance and more generally, he saw the role of the 
experimentalist being overshadowed by that of the theorist. 
(Bromberg 4) 
Matthias’ concern that the experimentalist was once again being overshadowed by the 
theorist as a result of BCS theory shows that despite the concrete approach in development of 
the theory, BCS theory ultimately joining up with quantum theory after solving the anomaly 
was seen as unfavourable to experimentalists since it seemed like BCS theory subscribed to 
the theory-driven view all along, rather than relying on experimental results.  This concern is 
important for the distinction between the abstract and concrete since it shows that on the 
spectrum of reliance the abstract and the concrete, the end point of BCS theory is much 
closer to relying on and accounting for both equally, in stark contrast with the London-
London model.  This shows the thought that BCS theory was in a sense more “theory-like” or 
closer to the abstract than the London-London model.  This “theory-likeness” can be seen 
through BCS’ categorization as a “theory” when named as so by the scientific community as 
well as through the fact that its results could later be applicable to the wider field of quantum 
theory.  While this will be described in more detail in the following section, it is important to 
note this as a major difference between the two cases to show the spectrum of reliance on the 
concrete level. 
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3.3 Beginnings of BCS Theory 
Similar to the creation of the London-London model, BCS theory arose through the need to 
solve a critical problem that previous superconductivity theories such as the London-London 
model and the later Ginzburg-Landau theory could not explain due to the lack of a 
microscopic mechanism in their theory.  Furthermore, theories that correctly captured the 
isotope effect still had difficulties in calculating the proper level of energies between normal 
and superconducting states (Bardeen, Cooper, and Schrieffer 162).  In this section, I will 
show how the development of BCS theory is parallel to the development of the London-
London model in the manner in which they distance themselves from the abstract for the 
concrete as a method of problem solving when faced with an anomaly.  I will also show how 
the difference between the concrete and the phenomenological arises here since the 
development of the London-London model can be considered more phenomenological than 
the development of BCS, which shows how the reliance on directly observable phenomenon 
can classify a model as more theory like. 
While the London-London model could account for the Meissner effect better than the 
previous models through focusing on the concrete rather than a defunct theory, the issue with 
the London-London model was that it was ultimately phenomenological, and did not explain 
the phenomena on a microphysical basis (Kragh 376).  Herbert Frohlich, a German physicist 
positing the interaction between electrons and quantized lattice vibrations, discovered the 
isotope effect despite the lack of theoretical reasons for its existence.  The isotope effect 
posits that the critical temperature of a superconductor’s transition would decrease with the 
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atomic mass of the superconductor (Kragh 377).  Indeed, with experiments confirming that 
the critical temperature varies as the inverse square root of the atomic mass, Frohlich’s 
suspicions were supported.  However, in only accounting for the electron-phonon interaction, 
Frohlich’s theory could not account for the difference in energy between a material’s 
superconducting state and its normal state.  The energy difference arose from the fact that a 
superconductor exhibited much lower energy than anticipated after the phase transition. 
To solve the issue of Frohlich’s theory not being able to account for the energy difference 
between normal and superconducting states, Bardeen set out a four pronged attack.  Within 
the four prongs, we can see the influence of both the importance of the abstract and the 
concrete as methods for problem solving.  This four pronged attack along with the work of 
Leon Cooper and John Scrieffer resulted in the discovery of “Cooper pairs”, where electrons 
with opposite spin may form bound boson pairs as a result of a previously undiscovered 
possibility of attractive interaction (Kragh 377).  Electrons pairing up to form a boson state 
means that more than one electron can be in the same spin state.  Forming a boson precludes 
the two electrons in the pair from being subject to the Pauli Exclusion Principle thus allowing 
for lower energy states. 
BCS theory, advanced in 1957, combined electron-phonon interaction posited by Frohlich 
with the notion of electron pairing.  This accounted for direct Coulomb repulsion and showed 
that at lower energies, there may be an attractive force between electrons.  BCS theory 
explained all experimentally known facts, and it made novel quantitative predictions which 
were confirmed.  While theorists found it worthwhile to investigate connections between 
  50 
superconductors and the more general area of quantum theory, experimentalists began 
searching for superconducting materials with higher critical temperatures (Kragh 378-9). 
3.4 The Abstract in BCS Theory 
Reliance on the abstract in the development of BCS theory can be seen through previous 
quantum theoretical applications as well as in contrast to the model developed by the London 
brothers.  Frohlich’s theory was an important catalyst for Bardeen’s reliance on the concrete 
level in searching for a solution to the issue of difference in energy levels between a 
material’s superconducting and non-superconducting states.  
A difference between the London-London model and BCS includes the end result of the 
concrete models.  The London-London model distances itself from both Bloch’s quantum 
theory of metals as well as the acceleration equation based on Maxwell’s equations, but also 
does not offer a connection to a future microphysical theory.  Whereas, BCS theory, being 
more theory-like itself as it goes beyond experimental data to posit quantum interactions, 
offers an end connection to abstract theories. 
The difference between the London-London model’s development and BCS theory’s is 
made explicit through BCS’ categorization as a theory, and the London brother’s discovery 
as a model.  This distinction can be seen after the development of BCS through the Nobel 
Prize description and through secondary sources citing BCS as a theory (The Nobel Prize in 
Physics 1972).  This difference in nomenclature shows that BCS is at least closer to a theory 
in the mind of the non-philosopher.  This closeness of theory is seen in the manner of BCS 
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joining up with quantum theory once the concrete model has been utilized for solving the 
energy differential issue. 
We thus find within solid state physics in the 1950s through the 
1980s at least two experimental traditions.  One interacts with 
theory and works with materials amenable to theory.  The 
other, represented by Matthias, is either anterior to theory or 
parallel to and distinct from it, as he later saw it. (Bromberg 8) 
This view from the experimentalist scientists further shows that BCS was ultimately 
amenable to theory rather than opposed to it.  Where the London-London model failed to 
connect their macroscopic model to a budding quantum theory of the time, BCS allows for 
this connection on the other side of the crisis.  
Working with theory without placing sole importance on that theory shows how the 
development of BCS theory aligns with Cartwright’s view of the theories and models as tools 
of the scientist.  Indeed, it is not the case that Cartwright et al. encourage the whole 
abandonment of theory in all situations (Cartwright and Suarez “Theories: Tools vs. Models” 
11).  While theory does not often produce representations on its own, it may be used as a tool 
to construct models that do represent a phenomenon (Cartwright and Suarez “Theories: Tools 
vs. Models” 5).  By ultimately connecting BCS theory to quantum theory, we see that it is 
amenable to theory. 
3.5 The Concrete in BCS Theory 
Reliance on the concrete level in BCS theory arose through Bardeen’s ultimate consideration 
of the phenomenon of energy differentials as well as his experimental work to understand the 
shielding effect of Coulomb repulsion. 
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We see a return to the need of focusing on the phenomenon rather than the underlying 
theory which led us astray.  Matricon and Waysand argue in Cold Wars that, “An invitation 
to write the article on the theory of superconductivity for Handbuch der Physik of 1955 
allowed Bardeen to develop a phenomenological description of the main experimental facts.” 
(149)  Phenomenological means that Bardeen is concerned with a focus on the occurrence of 
the phenomenon as a whole.  In developing a phenomenological description of experimental 
facts, Bardeen referred to the actual, specific instance of electron coupling and the shielding 
effect of Coulomb repulsion.  Handling the main experimental facts without a heavy reliance 
on previous quantum theories shows the importance of focusing on the concrete during a 
time of crisis. 
Furthermore, collaborators of Bardeen commented on his focus on the concrete during the 
time that normal quantum science could not problem solve for the energy differential issue: 
David Pines stands out among his collaborators; the two 
worked side by side for thirty-two years.  His impression of 
Bardeen’s working habits thus has special meaning: 
[1] Focus first on the experimental results, by careful 
reading of the literature and personal contact with members of 
leading experimental groups. 
[2] Develop a phenomenological description that ties the 
key experimental facts together. 
[3] Avoid bringing along prior theoretical baggage, and do 
not insist that a phenomenological description map onto a 
particular model.  Explore alternative physical pictures and 
mathematical descriptions without becoming wedded to a 
specific theoretical approach…. (Matricon and Waysand 148 – 
149) 
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We can see some differences in problem solving approaches between Bardeen and the 
London brothers through [1], but those minor differences can be forgotten with the great 
similarities of approaches through [2] and [3].  Where the London brothers did not want to 
focus solely on measurements (Bueno et al., “Empirical Factors and Structural Transferrence 
97), Bardeen focused on experimental results.  While I have pegged this as a difference 
between the two sets of scientists, it is not necessarily the case since measurements are 
generally a part of experimental facts.  The London brothers concerned themselves with the 
experimental results of the existence of the Meissner effect.  While Fritz London may have 
tried to distance himself from solely relying on measurement related results, Cartwright and 
Suarez argue that he focused first and foremost on the entirety of experimental results 
including a phenomenal view of resistanceless expulsion of magnetic fields in the Meissner 
effect.  Without knowing Bardeen’s views toward the measurement related subset of 
experimental results, I cannot comment on whether this point was truly a difference in 
problem solving technique. 
Through [2] and [3], we can see the parallel problem solving methods more clearly. 
[2] was developed through Bardeen developing a description of strong interactions 
between electrons and phonons for Handbuch der Physik of 1955.  Bardeen had encouraged 
Pines to pursue this line of inquiry, where Pines began to study polar crystals where electrons 
are strongly coupled to high-frequency phonons.  [3] can be seen through Pines developing a 
technique which had already been used in the study of mesons, and applied it to electron-
phonon coupling (Matricon and Waysand 149).  The lack of prior theoretical baggage also 
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presented itself in Bardeen’s confirmation of the effects of Coulomb repulsion between 
electrons in electron-phonon interactions.  His model yielded the prediction that two 
electrons in a solid need not always repel each other, rather, in certain conditions, they might 
attract each other (Matricon and Waysand 149). 
3.5.1 Concrete but not Phenomenological 
It is important to note that even though Pines reported Bardeen developing a 
phenomenological description of electron-phonon interactions to deal with the issue of 
superconductivity, I argue that this does not entirely map up with the terminology of a 
phenomenological model presented by Cartwright et al.   
A phenomenological model is constructed via reliance on experimental facts.  Electron-
Phonon interactions in BCS theory, however, are not empirically accessible.  This does not 
change its classification of relying on the concrete since Pines reports that Bardeen 
approached the problem without first focusing on the theory.  The London-London model 
was considered phenomenological by Cartwright et al. since the model developed was 
predominantly based on the experimental facts gathered regarding the phenomenon of the 
Meissner effect.  Unlike BCS, this model remained phenomenological since it did not lend 
itself to a connection with quantum theory of the time. 
The BCS model, however, ultimately lent itself to a connection with the abstract, quantum 
theory of the time.  The BCS model is considered concrete since it can only be applied to a 
specific case of superconductivity.  The concrete refers to singular phenomenon.  This is the 
same difference as the formula for Hooke’s law vs. Newton’s second law of motion.  
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Hooke’s law applies specifically to springs, whereas, 𝐹 = 𝑚𝑎 applies to a range of topics 
that includes springs.  Since current quantum theory applies to a range of topics including 
superconductivity, the abstract level of Newton’s second law is used in a similar manner as 
the abstract level of current quantum theory.  Ultimately, the BCS model supplied a better 
articulation to quantum theory in the specific case of superconductors by showing the 
possibility of electron pairing.  The discoveries of BCS theory assisted in fitting out quantum 
theory to the phenomenon of superconductivity.  As such, the BCS model is concrete under 
Cartwright’s classification.  However, in its ultimate connection to quantum theory, it is not 
phenomenological in the same sense as the London-London model.  The electron coupling 
described by BCS advances our knowledge of quantum theory due to its application in 
superfluidity.  In this manner, discoveries in BCS can expand the fundamental abstract 
theory.  
3.6 The Shift from Abstract to Concrete 
Similar to the move from the abstract to the concrete during a time of crisis at the London-
London account, reliance on the concrete in problem solving can once again be seen in the 
development of BCS theory. 
As pointed out in a previous section about experimentalists in light of BCS, the focus on 
the concrete gained traction as a problem solving method when theory did not suffice.  The 
issue of explaining the energy differential via prior quantum theories was an anomaly in the 
progress of work in superconductivity.  The lower energy state of superconducting materials 
after phase transition could not be explained given Frohlich’s theory.  As such, the workings 
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of normal science were interrupted, and a crisis ultimately resulting in the discovery of 
Cooper-pairs as an explanation of the energy differential arose. 
According to Kuhn’s stages of a scientific revolution, a revolution only ends when a new 
paradigm is accepted.  This new paradigm must include theoretical components that can 
solve the anomalies the previous paradigm could not (Kuhn 152).  BCS theory supplied a key 
piece of information to be incorporated within quantum theory in the form of Cooper pairs.  
Since this had application outside of BCS theory, it can be seen as the articulation of a new 
paradigm of quantum theory – different from the old quantum theory in that it is now 
microphysically possible to explain surprisingly low energy levels of a material in 
superconducting or superfluid states.  In this manner, we can see that, while a reliance shift to 
the concrete level can assist in problem solving, creating a model that can ultimately connect 
to the abstract level of a paradigm is necessary to end the stage of crisis.  This also shows that 
a model developed through reliance on the concrete level is indeed temporary, but its 
temporariness does not conflict with its necessity. 
3.6.1 Problem Solving 
The need for focusing on the concrete in the case of the BCS theory shows a crisis since the 
normal science paradigm of quantum theory could not account for the energy differential 
present in superconductors during phase transition.  This perpetuated a crisis in the sub field 
of superconductivity where it seemed as though the Meissner effect still could not be 
accounted for with quantum theory of the time.  While fundamental quantum theory may 
have provided a greater number of predictions to be tested, these predictions did not include 
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the phenomenon of electron coupling.  In this manner, the focus on the concrete rather than 
the results of the theory allowed for the positing of electron coupling in BCS theory. 
The focus on the concrete aligns with the instrumental method presented by Cartwright in 
“Tool Box” even though there is no outright dismissal of the abstract.  Critics may argue that 
since BCS ultimately lends itself to the modification of quantum theory, the distinction 
between the abstract and the concrete is muddled.  This would be an issue since I argue that 
the distinction leads to the possible reliance on the concrete during times of crisis, and 
reliance on the abstract during times of normal science.  It may be the case that the 
distinction became muddled after the full development and acceptance of BCS since BCS 
theory ultimately connects to modern day quantum theory.  However, this distinction stands 
during the time of problem solving for the anomaly of electron energy differential.   
This distinction also aligns with the instrumentalist method outlined in “Tool Box”.  It can 
be realized through distinguishing parts of the timeline of development of BCS to show that 
the abstract and concrete may have become muddled after the findings of the theory were 
applied to the larger quantum theory.  We first have Frohlich’s theory gaining traction in 
accounting for the relation between the critical temperature of a superconductor and the 
atomic mass of the superconducting material.  Then this theory encountered the issue of 
explaining the energy difference between the material’s normal state and superconducting 
state.  Bardeen, Cooper, and Schrieffer utilized the phenomenon of the energy difference to 
posit condensation of electron pairs.  Cooper pairs also connected to other areas of quantum 
theory including an explanation of superfluidity of helium-3 at low temperatures. 
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The application of Cooper pairs to areas outside of superconductivity, though still within 
low temperature physics, shows the end of the anomaly in superconductivity.  It also shows 
how reliance on the concrete may ultimately be temporary, but this temporariness is not a 
problem in itself. 
3.7 Summary of the Differences in Philosophical Assessments between BCS 
and the London-London Model 
As presented in the previous chapter, the London-London model has been topic of 
philosophical conversation regarding model creation strategies.  BCS theory, however, has 
seen less discussion in the literature in the context of the distinction between abstract and 
concrete levels.  This difference can be seen through the naming of the London-London 
solution a model, and BCS as a theory.  The London-London model was a phenomenological 
model that relied on the experimental facts of the Meissner effect to create an equation which 
reflected the expulsion of a magnetic field inside the superconductor.  BCS theory, even 
while focusing on the concrete issue of the energy differential, posited electron interactions 
that were not confirmed by experimental facts of the time. 
The London-London model also remained autonomous from theory as it did not add to the 
development of quantum theory of the time.  The equation merely applied to the case of 
superconductors.  BCS theory, however, ultimately connected the solution of the electron 
differential issue to other areas of quantum theory. 
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Chapter 4 
Summary and Conclusion 
In chapter 1, I exposited the presence of the abstract/concrete distinction in various pieces of 
philosophy of science literature.  I presented Kuhn’s outline of the distinction between 
symbolic generalizations and manipulations along with his outline of a scientific revolution 
as well as Cartwright’s argument about the abstract and the concrete in model construction.  
Terminologies were clarified to argue that the abstract refers to a fundamental theory and the 
concrete refers to the phenomenon in occurrence.  Lastly, other views on the distinction by 
Nugaev and Schindler were exposited and contrasted with both Kuhn and Cartwright’s 
views. 
Chapter 2 focused on showing how the development of the London-London model of 
superconductivity utilized a shift in reliance from the abstract to the concrete as the main tool 
for model construction.  This was shown with a discussion of previous philosophical 
literature by Cartwright et al. and French, Ladyman, Bueno, and Da Costa, where Cartwright 
argued that the London-London model was created phenomenologically.  I then argued in the 
same vein as Cartwright using the areas of reliance on both the abstract and the concrete in 
the development of this model to conclude that the London-London model was indeed both 
concrete and phenomenological.  Furthermore, I placed the London-London model within 
Kuhn’s framework for scientific change to extend Cartwright et al.’s argument of the 
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usefulness of phenomenological models and show that its reliance on the concrete level 
assisted in problem solving when the abstract level of a pre-existing paradigm failed. 
Chapter 3 focused on the concrete development of BCS theory as a major successor to the 
London-London model. I argued that despite BCS theory seeming to be more “theory-like” 
to the scientific community, it developed with heavier reliance on the concrete than the 
abstract due to Frohlich’s theory not being able to account for the energy difference between 
a material’s superconducting and non-superconducting states.  This is similar to the 
development of the London-London model.  Both methods resolved anomalies in previous 
theories by focusing on the phenomenon causing the anomaly rather than deferring to theory.   
Furthermore, I argued that BCS theory ultimately resolved the crisis by ultimately providing 
a link to larger quantum theory through the application of Cooper pairs outside of 
superconductivity.  This extended Cartwright et. al.’s argument by utilizing a unique case 
study and framing it under the more comprehensive notion of Kuhnian paradigms. 
Both chapters 2 and 3 showed the importance of a model developed through a reliance on 
the concrete level.  These models allowed scientists to continue problem solving at times 
when the abstract level of a paradigm could not account for occurring phenomenon.  Within a 
Kuhnian framework, we can now see that concrete models have a temporary but needed role 
in problem solving during paradigm shifts.
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Appendix A 
Timeline of the London-London Model 
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Appendix B 
Timeline of BCS theory 
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